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The Real (Sentencing) World:  
State Sentencing in the Post-Blakely Era 
 
 
Douglas A. Berman* and Steven L. Chanenson** 
 
Soon after the Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington1 declared certain 
judicial fact-finding within a state sentencing guideline system unconstitutional, 
Justice O’Connor described the Court’s decision as a “Number 10 earthquake.”2  
Leading commentator Frank Bowman called Blakely a train wreck,3 and many 
others recognized the profound potential ramifications of Blakely for modern 
sentencing reforms.4  Blakely engendered such reactions in part because it was 
something of a throwback to the era of the Warren Court: as in cases like Gideon v 
Wainwright5 and Miranda v Arizona,6 a group of Justices in Blakely announced a 
bold and dramatic interpretation of the Bill of Rights that would require many 
states to modify traditional and long-established criminal justice practices.7 
But two years after the Blakely ruling, the case’s broader impact and meaning 
for criminal justice systems around the country has been largely overshadowed by 
developments in the federal sentencing system.  Despite the fact that Blakely 
                                                                                                                            
*   William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State 
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1   542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
2   See Senate, Judges Urge ‘Blakely’ Redux, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 2004, at 2 (quoting Justice 
O’Connor’s comment at the Ninth Circuit’s annual conference in July 2004 that the Blakely case 
“looks like a Number 10 earthquake”). 
3   See Frank O. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be 
Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2004). 
4   See generally Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1; 
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 316 (2004). 
5   372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
6   384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
7   See Robert Weisberg, A Quiet Bombshell in the Legal World, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006 
(describing Blakely as a ruling that has taken its place, like Gideon and Miranda, as a “precedent that 
would change the course of American criminal justice”).  Cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical 
Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493 (2006) (drawing various 
connections between the work of the Warren Court and the Blakely ruling).  For a fascinating set of 
recent articles reflecting on the criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court, see Symposium, The 
Warren Court Criminal Justice Revolution: Reflections a Generation Later, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 
(2005). 
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evaluated state sentencing procedures, a great deal of the resulting buzz revolved 
around how this decision might affect the federal scheme.  Indeed, much of the 
legal world waited with baited breath for the Supreme Court to determine the 
application of Blakely to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. 
Booker,8 and has subsequently fawned over what Booker means and how Congress 
could or should respond. 
The symposium in this issue of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law seeks 
to ensure that the broader stories of Blakely and modern state sentencing reforms 
get the attention they merit.  Looking ahead to future Supreme Court rulings and 
looking back on post-Blakely developments, contributors to this Symposium enrich 
our understanding of Blakely’s impact and enhance the insights to be drawn from 
state sentencing reform efforts. 
 
I. SPOTLIGHTING THE STATES 
 
State courts handle many more criminal cases than the federal courts.9  State 
sentencing procedures touch the lives of many more defendants, victims and 
witnesses than the federal sentencing system.  Yet, these realities often get lost in 
all the attention paid to the federal sentencing system in the era of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines, perhaps because the federal system is in everyone’s 
backyard whether that backyard is in Manhattan or Montana.  Especially in the 
academic world, there is seemingly endless interest in federal sentencing law and 
practices, but precious little discussion of state sentencing reforms generally or of 
developments in particular states.10   
State sentencing is under-examined in part because state systems are difficult 
to comprehensively analyze, either individually or collectively.  While sharing 
important similarities, state sentencing systems are diverse and can often be 
difficult to understand fully.11  The backdrop for state sentencing is often dynamic: 
some states have not completed long-needed criminal code revisions or re-
codifications, others have relatively modern (though rarely model) penal codes, 
                                                                                                                            
8   543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
9   In 2002, less than 65,000 of the 1,114,217 felony convictions in the United States were in 
the federal criminal justice system, meaning that state court counted for 94% of the adult felony 
convictions in the United States.  See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 1 (2004), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf. 
10  There are a few notable exceptions.  At the top of the too short list of those academics who 
have written extensively about state sentencing systems are Professors Richard Frase, Marc Miller, 
Kevin Reitz, and Ronald Wright.  Cf. Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for 
Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1354 n.8 (2005) (identifying Professors Frase, Reitz and Wright as academics 
taking state sentencing seriously).   
11  See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1191 (2005). 
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and every state is regularly adding new offenses and sentencing terms.  The impact 
of state sentencing is often opaque: most states do a poor job of producing 
accessible crime and sentencing information,12 thus making state systems hard to 
examine and assess from a distance.   
Nevertheless, in light of popular rhetoric about the virtues of federalism and 
frequent references to states as laboratories,13 federal policy-makers and academics 
ought to care greatly about what states are actually doing in the realm of 
sentencing.  States are doing quite a bit, and have been doing quite a bit for quite a 
long time.  Starting more than twenty-five years ago, states pioneered structured 
sentencing in the form of guidelines, with Minnesota, Pennsylvania and 
Washington leading the way.14  More recently, many states have developed 
innovative ways to handle a variety of offenders and offenses through drug courts, 
intermediate and alternative punishments, and re-entry initiatives.15  Numerous 
states have long moved past the seemingly binary morass of prison or probation in 
which much of the federal system continues to languish.16   
 
II. SUPREME INTERVENTION 
 
The Supreme Court recently has paid a lot of attention to state sentencing: 
through Apprendi v. New Jersey17 in 2000 and Blakely v. Washington18 in 2004, the 
Supreme Court declared certain state sentencing procedures unconstitutional.  And 
yet, these landmark rulings have, in various ways, reflected federal input and a 
federal imprint.  At oral argument in Blakely, more time was spent discussing the 
operation of the federal sentencing guidelines than the guidelines in operation in 
                                                                                                                            
12  See Miller, supra note 10, at 1354 (“State legislators, state sentencing commissioners, and 
state commission staff have generally not tried to make information about individual sentences or 
about their sentencing systems reasonably accessible.”). 
13  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.”). 
14  See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal 
Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 70 (1999); see also Appendix: A 
Summary of the Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania Guidelines, in THE SENTENCING 
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987). 
15  See generally Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From 
Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. 
Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 
(2000). 
16  See generally NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: 
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990). 
17  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
18  542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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Washington.19  The opinions in Apprendi and Blakely—especially those of the 
dissenting Justices—seemed most concerned about what these rulings meant for 
the federal sentencing guidelines.20  As noted before, the loudest and most 
persistent buzz following these decisions concerned their possible impact on the 
federal sentencing system. 
The direct and indirect impact of Apprendi and especially Blakely in the states 
is a rich and dynamic story, with many facets and lessons that should not be 
overlooked. 21  Especially since Blakely was decided in June 2004, state 
legislatures and state courts have, with divergent results, grappled with the 
Supreme Court’s modern sentencing jurisprudence.  Though the diverse state 
reactions to Blakely are not easily summarized, it is fair to characterize a division 
between states of “evolution” and states of “denial.”22  Evolution states have 
accepted that Blakely affects their sentencing regimes, and responded in ways 
seeking to fit local circumstances.  In contrast, denial states, acting through their 
state supreme courts, have resisted seemingly strong arguments that Blakely 
impacts their structured sentencing systems.  
The Supreme Court is partially responsible for some of the post-Blakely 
confusion as a result of its follow-up decision in Booker, which engineered an 
“advisory guidelines” remedy for the federal system to preserve a significant role 
for judicial fact-finding at sentencing.  Relying heavily on Booker, several state 
supreme courts—namely California, New Mexico, and Tennessee—have declared 
that their structured sentencing systems, which rely significantly on judicial fact-
finding, do not need mending after Blakely.23  
By granting review in California v. Cunningham this past spring, the Supreme 
Court brings these issues to the national stage.  Cunningham explores the 
constitutionality of California’s structured sentencing system after the California 
Supreme Court decided that Booker suggested the state’s sentencing procedures 
are constitutionally sound.24  California is not a guidelines state, but it has a 
statutory structured sentencing system that provides for three sentencing tiers 
(lower, middle and upper).  At issue in Cunningham is the imposition of “upper 
term” sentences, which are only available after a trial judge finds the existence of 
                                                                                                                            
19  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-
1632). 
20  See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 429–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523–
54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
21  See generally The State of Blakely in the States, FED. SENT’G REP. Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005); 
Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as a Structural Limit on Errors, 
94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003). 
22  See Steven L. Chanenson & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Evolution and Denial: State Sentencing 
After Blakely and Booker, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2005) (sorting State jurisdictions after Blakely into 
ones of “evolution” or “denial”). 
23  See id. at 3 (discussing state rulings in California, New Mexico, and Tennessee). 
24  See People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005). 
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an aggravating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.  At first blush, the 
California Supreme Court’s preservation of this system seems to disregard 
Blakely’s declaration that the jury must find statutory-maximum-enhancing facts.  
Cunningham could be seen as little more than an opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to indicate that “[it] meant what [it] said and [it] said what [it] meant”25 in 
Blakely.   
But Professors Douglas Berman and Stephanos Bibas highlight in their article 
that much more is at stake in Cunningham.  Writing directly to the Supreme Court, 
Berman and Bibas catalogue competing principles in play within sentencing 
systems and they spotlight the broader importance of how the Court approaches 
Cunningham.  Berman and Bibas express concern that the Supreme Court’s recent 
formalistic and rigid approach to the Sixth Amendment could “strangl[e] 
democratic innovation and can disserve procedural justice and defendants’ 
interests.”26  They urge the Court to bring greater flexibility and nuance to its 
sentencing jurisprudence because states, “which sentence most defendants, serve 
as laboratories of democratic experimentation and need room to try novel 
sentencing arrangements.”27 
Yet, Cunningham may be another state sentencing case in which a federal 
subtext looms large.  California is defending its sentencing system by arguing that 
it operates as a state equivalent to the federal sentencing system after Booker.  
Consequently, it will be hard for the Justices to avoid pondering the federal 
implications of its work in Cunningham.  Indeed, if the Supreme Court delivers a 
broad ruling, it may provide a glimpse into the application of advisory guidelines 
and reasonableness review in the federal system after Booker.28  The Court could 
also tip its hand in Cunningham as to what other issues stemming from the 
Apprendi-Blakely-Booker line are likely to capture its imagination and space on its 
docket.29  
 
 
                                                                                                                            
25  DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 16 (1940). 
26  Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 37, 38 (2006). 
27  Id. 
28  See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Cunningham: Why Federal Practitioners and Policy Makers 
Should Pay Attention, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 260 (2006). 
29  The Supreme Court has also agreed to hear argument this November addressing the 
retroactivity of Blakely to state criminal sentences in Burton v. Waddington.  It is interesting to note 
that the Petitioner in Burton is stressing the importance of the state, opposed to federal, character of 
the sentence in that case.  Brief for the Petitioner, Burton v. Waddington, 22–23, No. 05-9222 (2006).  
One is left to wonder whether the strong state sentencing focus of Burton is part of the reason that 
case has not gotten much attention.  See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Press Coverage of Cert Grant in 
Burton, Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/ 
2006/06/press_coverage_.html (noting that the mainstream media “has just a little coverage” of the 
Burton cert. grant). 
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III. SEEING THE REFORM FOREST AMONG THE DOCTRINAL TREES 
 
The doctrinal uncertainty and confusion produced by Blakely and Booker 
makes it dangerously easy for jurisdictions to be concerned primarily with 
technical problems in particular sentencing laws rather than with broader reform 
issues.  But the Supreme Court’s coming work in Cunningham, like Blakely before 
it, should motivate state legislatures, courts, and sentencing commissions to re-
examine and improve their sentencing systems.30  The two other contributions to 
this symposium spotlight the reform stories that should not get lost in any debate 
about the particularities and peculiarities of the Supreme Court’s modern 
sentencing jurisprudence. 
Whatever one thinks about the Supreme Court’s modern Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court’s efforts merit praise for engendering a robust national 
dialogue on sentencing law, policy, procedures, and practices.  From a practical 
perspective, such a dialogue is long overdue because federal and state prison 
populations have swelled in the last two decades, reaching record-highs nearly 
every year.31  Is this the result legislatures desired?  Is it a wise policy?  A 
conversation at this level is vital.  From a conceptual perspective, a national 
sentencing dialogue is also long overdue because the theories, structures, and 
procedures for modern sentencing decision-making have not been seriously 
rethought following the modern rejection of a now seemingly antiquated 
rehabilitative sentencing philosophy.32  Particularly at the macro level, our 
sentencing structures should flow from our punishment purposes.  The critical 
links between sentencing purposes and means also merits serious discussion.  
States should capitalize on the renewed attention that Cunningham brings to 
muster the political support to examine thoroughly existing sentencing systems and 
to fix what needs fixing.   
Pragmatism, practicalities and politics drive many state sentencing reforms.33  
State policy makers want to follow the Constitution, of course, but many 
justifiably recognize that the Constitution sets only relatively wide outer 
boundaries of permissible sentencing structures and laws.  Policy makers are often 
less concerned with constitutional restrictions, especially as they juggle competing 
goals such as crime control, fiscal limitations, uniformity, and individualization, 
and confront the long-standing struggle for criminal justice hegemony between the 
legislature and the judiciary.  Professor Michael Tonry has elegantly described one 
aspect of this perpetual balancing act: 
                                                                                                                            
30  Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 379 (2005). 
31  See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 1 (May 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf. 
32  See Berman, supra note 4, at 2–3 . 
33  See, e.g., Berman & Bibas, supra note 26 at 62; Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding 
the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 7 (2005). 
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Like all calls for just the right amount of anything, not too much and not 
too little, a proposal for sentencing standards that are constraining 
enough to assure that like cases are treated alike and flexible enough to 
assure that different cases are treated differently is a counsel of 
unattainable perfection.  Nonetheless, that is probably what most people 
would want to see in a just system of sentencing . . . .34 
 
In addition to recognizing that sentencing perfection is unattainable, states can 
and should appreciate that certain structures for developing sentencing law and 
policy have proven particularly effective in achieving sentencing improvements.  
Specifically, as the American Law Institute is stressing in its on-going revision of 
the sentencing part of the Model Penal Code,35 a vigorous, representative and well-
funded sentencing commission offers the best hope for developing and refining a 
fair and responsive sentencing system.36   
Creating and empowering a sentencing commission closes few, if any, 
substantive options for state sentencing systems.  The resulting sentences urged by 
a sentencing commission can be comparatively high and tightly controlled by a 
central authority.  In contrast, sentences can also be set relatively low and 
sentencing decisions can be left comparatively unencumbered by binding 
guidance.  A pro-commission view is a process-oriented recommendation with 
few, if any, inherent substantive sentencing consequences.   
As Professor Richard Frase’s article highlights, a strong commission can 
assist a state in navigating the turbulent constitutional waters of sentencing in a 
way that makes sense for a particular locality.37  The Minnesota Sentencing 
Commission played a crucial role in guiding its criminal justice system through the 
shoals of the post-Blakely world.  It has helped Minnesota maintain and improve 
its presumptive sentencing guidelines scheme to the general satisfaction of the 
relevant decision-makers.38 
States often face more pressing, functional concerns than the occasional 
constitutional question.  One persistent and recurring issue is money.  Unlike their 
federal counterparts, state lawmakers are often very attuned to prison costs.  A 
sentencing commission can allow lawmakers to predict and, to some extent, 
control corrections costs.  In certain jurisdictions, this fiscal role may be a 
powerful reason why commissions survive politically and earn their seat at the 
                                                                                                                            
34  MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 185–86 (1996). 
35  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT (2003). 
36  Chanenson & Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 4 (asserting that while not perfect, “accountable 
yet independent-minded sentencing commissions are the best frontline policy-making tool that any 
jurisdiction can employ”). 
37  Richard S. Frase, Blakely in Minnesota: Two Years Out: Guidelines Sentencing is Alive 
and Well, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73 (2006); see also Chanenson & Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 1. 
38  Frase, supra note 37 at 79. 
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policy-making table.39  Other commissions rely mainly on the strength of a 
powerful supporter, frequently a respected member of the judiciary.  However it 
earns a role in the policy process, the leadership of a sentencing commission can 
help innovative ideas germinate and then nurture them as they take root.   
As spotlighted by Chief Justice Michael Wolf’s article, the Missouri 
Sentencing Advisory Commission offers a shining example of commission 
leadership tailored to the needs and environment of its jurisdiction.  In Missouri’s 
“fully voluntary”40 sentencing system, the “Commission has embarked on an 
information-based system to make its wholly discretionary system effective.”41  
The initial results of this enormous undertaking have been encouraging.  In other 
states, the presence and actions of the commission have furthered the stability of 
existing state structured sentencing regimes.  Professor Frase’s article showcases 
just such an experience in Minnesota.  The resulting systems in Missouri and 
Minnesota are poles apart, but the central role of the sentencing commission stands 
out as a unifying feature.  Both systems showcase that sentencing commissions 
bring together experts who can be responsive to the distinctive needs of their 
jurisdictions while pursuing a level of fairness and rationality that can be 
particularly elusive in the legislative heat of the moment.42   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This is an exciting time for state sentencing.  With yet another state 
sentencing case before the Supreme Court, state systems might start to get some of 
the recognition and academic attention they so richly deserve.  We hope this 
Symposium does its small part.  There is a reason many commentators refer to 
Justice Brandeis’ description of states as laboratories of democracy;43 it is often 
true.  In no area of law is that expression more true, more current, and more 
                                                                                                                            
39  See Tom Lininger, Oregon’s Response to Blakely, 18 FED. SENT’G. REP. 29, 30 (2005) 
(noting that “the Oregon Legislature had a strong stake in predictable sentencing: accurate forecasting 
of prison populations is necessary in order to budget money for prison beds.”); cf. Chanenson & 
Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 4 (“Sentencing commissions can and should demonstrate not only that 
they deserve a seat at the table but also that the others at the table need them to be there.”). 
40  See Chanenson, supra note 30, at 409 (discussing definition). 
41  Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 95 (2006); see also id. at 99 (“By effective, I mean that the sentence is not 
counterproductive and does not encourage the offender to re-offend, but improves the prospects for 
avoiding future criminal behavior by the offender.”). 
42  Indeed, a few months after the Supreme Court granted review in Cunningham, California’s 
Little Hoover Commission started public hearings on sentencing reform with several noted 
sentencing authorities from across the country advocating in favor of commissions.  See 
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/sentencing.html.  It would be a fitting testament to state sentencing 
innovation and resilience if California could have a commission in place by the end of the Supreme 
Court’s term next summer regardless of the result in Cunningham. 
43  See, e.g., Chanenson & Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 1 & n.1. 
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relevant than sentencing.  The scientists at the heart of those laboratories are 
sentencing commissions.  They are each working with their own unique 
combination of elements, but they are all striving for real justice. 
